Introduction
The study attempts to identify individual reaction functions of the Polish Monetary Policy Council members in the period 2004-2005. In this case, the term "central bank's reaction function" means the rule according to which the central bank sets the short-term interest rate (see Taylor [1993] , [2001] , Woodford [2003] ). The central bank's reaction function, which describes the dependency between the basic instrument of monetary policy, i.e. the short-term interest rate, and each of its determinants (in most cases inflation, output gap and real exchange rate), is one of the key elements of monetary transmission mechanism. Together with the inflation equation and the IS curve, which describes the relation between the size of the output gap and the real interest rate, the central bank's reaction function is the most aggregated form of structural model of monetary transmission mechanism in a closed economy (in case of an open economy the model has to be extended to include an equation which explains changes in the real exchange rate) (Taylor [2001] , see also Kokoszczyński et al. [2002] ).
Many studies and papers in the field of monetary policy have been devoted to analysing the reaction function, and in most cases the monetary policy instrument was a continuous variable, most often the short-term interest rate from the money market (see e.g. Clarida et al. [1998] , Kłos et al. [2004] ).
In this study we applied a slightly different approach, according to which the Over the period covered by the study, MPC increased the interest rates three times and cut them four times, as well as made one change in bias of each kind: from neutral to tightening, from tightening to easing, from easing to neutral and from neutral to easing. Eight meetings of the Council ended up with a decision to leave both the interest rates and the bias unchanged.
Taking into account the fact that the Monetary Policy Council is a collective body and in the period covered by the study most decisions were not taken unanimously, in this study we identified reaction functions for each Council member separately. The applied approach enabled an estimate of parameters of individual reaction functions and created the conditions for comparing the sensitivity of the Council members to changes in each determinant of the future inflation.
Due to the qualitative character of the dependent variable, the microeconometric approach is used, in which ordered logit model was chosen to describe the behaviour or the tested variable.
Reaction function of the Monetary Policy Council

The form of the reaction function
The point of departure for specification of the reaction function for Polish central bank may be the well known Taylor rule, which has been widely used to describe the process of decision making in the European Central Bank (Clarida et al. [1998] ). This rule may be formulated as follows (Taylor [1999] )
where κ, λ ≥ 0, variable i t represents the monetary policy instrument (short-term interest rate), while r is the value of the long-term real interest rate, which is constant in this approach. The long-term nominal interest rate is then the aggregate of the real rate r and the central bank's inflation target πˆ, which is constant as well. In the Taylor rule (1) variable π t expresses the inflation rate, variable y t is the actual real output, while y * t is the potential output. The difference y t -y * t is called the output gap. On the basis of (1) the central bank changes the nominal interest rate i t , if current inflation differs from the inflation target or if the actual GDP differs from the potential output. small open economy, a form of the policy rule including, apart from the deviation of inflation from the inflation target and the output gap, also the real exchange rate. This function may be written in the form
where φ 0 > 0, φ 1 < 0, and variable e r t expresses the real effective exchange rate 1 .
In this study, we will discuss three variants of the central bank's reaction function (2), which differ in their definitions of variables on the right-hand side of the equality sign and in the interpretation of the MPC behaviour.
The firsts variant of the reaction function represents the hypothesis that MPC in Poland is backward looking. In this variant, the reaction function includes the following variables: inflation rate lagged by one period, the variable expressing seasonally adjusted annual growth rate of industrial output, also lagged by one period, and the variable expressing the month's average value of the nominal EUR/PLN exchange rate. In contrast to the equation (2) , the function suggested for the Polish economy includes the inflation rate lagged by one period 2 , because the Council knows only last month's value of inflation when it takes decisions on the interest rates.
In accordance with formula (2), the central bank reacts to inflation deviating from the inflation target, however, taking into account that the inflation target was constant in the 1 Growth of e r t means depreciation of the real exchange rate. 2 The analysis was based on monthly data. period covered by the study, the deviation from target can be replaced with the inflation rate, which will not affect the estimate of the parameter connected with this variable. In the proposed reaction function, output gap was treated in the same way. Assuming that in the period covered by the study, that is 2004-2005, the potential rate of output growth was constant, the output gap from formula (2) was replaced with seasonally adjusted annual growth rate of industrial output (also from the preceding period), which information is available in the monthly cycle. Then, considering the small difference in inflation rates in Poland and in the European Union in the period covered by the study, the real exchange rate was replaced with the nominal one. In addition, the effective exchange rate was not chosen, and only the bilateral rate against euro was left in the reaction function 3 .
Two other proposals of the reaction function correspond to the hypothesis that MPC in Poland acts forward looking.
In the second variant of the central bank's reaction function, on the right hand side there is only the expected inflation rate for 12 months. The inclusion in equation (2) 
Variant II: 4 In the third variant, the average monthly exchange rate was replaced with the value of exchange rate at the end of the month, since results of Reuters poll questionnaires used in this study do not contain expectations as to the average monthly value of exchange rate, but only as to the value of exchange rate at the end of the month. 5 Undoubtedly a better measure of the future inflation rate expected by MPC would be a published inflation forecast prepared by the Council itself. However, the Council does not provide official inflation forecasts, while in this case it is impossible to use in the study the inflation forecasts originating from the inflation projection of NBP and it is so for several reasons. First, the projection is prepared on the assumption of unchanged interest determined based on Reuters poll conducted every month among economists and bank analysts.
Definition of dependent variable in individual MPC members reaction functions
The reaction function in the form (3a)-(3c) was determined separately for each MPC member. However, this definition of variable i t does not guarantee that each observation can be unequivocally attributed the appropriate value of -1, 0 or 1, because in the period covered by the study there occurred a situation when certain MPC members at the same meeting voted for changing the bias from easing to neutral (that is for tightening the bias) while supporting the decision to cut interest rates. For this reason, additional assumptions had to be made for determining specific values of variable i t :
rates in the period covered by the projection, which does not have the be the most probable variant. Second, the projections were prepared at quarterly intervals and only from August 2004, which would significantly reduce the available statistical sample. Third, some Council members openly distanced themselves from the projections, stressing that they were projections of research staff of NBP and not projections of the Council. 6 At this stage of the research we ignore the interdependencies between particular MPC members, which in fact may have an impact on their final decisions (see Lombardelli et al. [2002]) voting, at the same time, for reduction of interest rates (falling restrictiveness) and for change of bias from easing to neutral (rising restrictiveness) is treated in aggregate as no change of the restrictiveness of the monetary policy, that is i t = 0;
voting, at the same time, for cutting interest rates and against change of bias from neutral to easing is interpreted as voting for easing of the monetary policy, that is
only the results of final voting were taken into account, i.e. if, during several partial votes at the given meeting, any Council member supported e.g. interest rate reduction, but in the final vote he/she was in favour of leaving the rates unchanged, then this result was treated as no change in the restrictiveness of the monetary policy, that is It is worth observing that, according to the definition of variable i t adopted in our study, in the period covered by the study Marian Noga and Halina Wasilewska-Trenkner voted always in the same way as Leszek Balcerowicz. In all the meetings taken into account here, also Andrzej Sławiński and Andrzej Wojtyna voted in the same way. Therefore, the empirical part of this paper will focus only on 7 individual functions of the Council members.
The results of these analyses will be presented in section 4, while section 3 describes the testing method applied in this paper, that is, a logit analysis.
Ordered logit model
Model form
The form of MPC reaction function was identified based on ordered logit model in which the dependent variable is a qualitative variable, but its subsequent categories, when quantified, may be ordered from the lowest to the highest one (see e.g. Pindyck, Rubinfeld [1991], Liao
[1994], Maddala [1998] ). In this model we assume that when taking decisions in the field of monetary policy, each Council member has a certain specified utility function which may be described using a non-observable variable I t * (where t is the number of the subsequent period -in this case month). Next we assume that the level of utility, that is, the value of variable I t * , depends on the values of variables used in the central bank's reaction function as explanatory variables, which may be written in a general form as
where x it , for i = 1,..., k means the variables making up the central bank's reaction function, β i reflects the value of the parameter which measures the influence of i-th variable on the level of utility of a Council member, while ε t is the random disturbance with zero expected value and constant variance. In this study, according to equation (2) 7 Variable y t in section 3 corresponds to variable i t in the remaining part of the paper.
Formulas (5a)-(5c) mean that if non-observable variable I t * , which in accordance with (4) constitutes a linear combination of variables making up the central bank's reaction function, is lower than a certain limit value τ 1 , then the given MPC member will decide to loosen the monetary policy (that is, to reduce interest rates or to change the bias from restrictive to neutral or from neutral to easing). If variable I t * is within the range from τ 1 to τ 2 , then the Council member will vote for leaving the rates and the bias unchanged. Finally, if variable I t * exceeds the limit value of τ 2, then the given Council member will vote for tightening the monetary policy (that is, for increase of interest rates or changing the bias to a more restrictive one). Therefore, the dependency described above indicates that increased value of variable I t * is accompanied by increased restrictiveness of the monetary policy, preferred by the given Council member.
Assuming a specific distribution for the random component ε t the parameters of equation (4) may be estimated using the maximum likelihood method. In the literature of the subject the two most often used types of distribution are: normal distribution and logistic distribution. In the first case, the analysed model is called probit model; in the second case we get a logit model (Pindyck, Rubinfeld [1991] ). For the purposes of this study it was assumed that random component ε t had logistic distribution.
Having selected the appropriate distribution, we can determine the conditional probabilities of the Council member taking a decision to ease, leave unchanged or tighten the monetary policy.
The probability, conditional on the values of variables making up vector x t , of easing of the monetary policy can be expressed as
which, after adoption of the assumption of logistic distribution of the random component e t , finally gives us
In the same way we can express also the conditional probabilities of lack of change in the monetary policy and tightening of the monetary policy
Using formulas (7a)-(7c), the logarithm of likelihood function for the analysed logit model may be formulated in the following form 
Interpretation of β parameters
In accordance with formula (4) the value of parameter β i expresses a change in the value of variable I t * caused by unit increment of the value of variable x it . However, due to the nonobservable nature of variable I t * , it is more interesting to interpret β parameters in terms of changing probability that variable Y t will assume a specific value -1, 0 or 1 depending on changes in values of explanatory variables in equation (4) . In particular, the following relations can be analysed here:
change in the value of probability that the given MPC member will vote for easing of the monetary policy (y t = -1), resulting from unit increment of explanatory variable x it , that is
change in the value of probability that the given MPC member will vote for tightening the monetary policy (y t = 1), resulting from unit increment of explanatory variable x it , that is means that growing x it will result in growing value of this probability, while its negative value will cause probability to fall.
Interpreting limit points τ
In an ordered logit model with multiple explanatory variables, limit values of τ 1 and τ 2 making up vector τ do not have a direct interpretation. However, in a model with a single explanatory variable we may interpret quotients τ 1 /β 1 and τ 2 /β 1 , which in accordance with formulas (4) and (5a)-(5c) determine the range of variability for the explanatory variable with which the given MPC member will vote for leaving the restrictiveness of the monetary policy unchanged.
Therefore, the explanatory variable values smaller than τ 1 /β 1 imply a decision on easing of the monetary policy, while values greater than τ 2 /β 1 imply a decision to tighten it. Since on one variant of the analysed reaction function of MPC (variant II) there is only one explanatory variable, in the empirical part of the paper for this model we will also present an interpretation of quotients τ 1 /β 1 and τ 2 /β 1 .
Forecasting based on ordered logit model
Substituting in formulas (7a)-(7c) estimates of parameters and instead of their true values β and τ we can calculate theoretical values of conditional probabilities of reduction, lack of change or increase in the restrictiveness of the monetary policy, that is
Next, according to the rule of maximal probability 8 , we can forecast the decisions taken by the given Council member for each time period t. This means that the forecast is this value of y t for which the theoretical value of probability is the highest. For that reason, equation (3a) was re-specified: the lagged inflation rate was replaced with the current one, which gave the following form of the reaction function
Results of analysis of individual reaction functions of member of the Monetary Policy
Formula (11) corresponds to the hypothesis that MPC members, when taking a decision in month t, consider the level of inflation in month t, and not in month t-1, preceding the Council's meeting. Taking into account the fact that in month t the Council members know only the level of inflation in month t-1 (inflation figures are published with a delay of approx.
14 days), this hypothesis means that they are able to correctly anticipate future inflation changes in the timeframe of at least one month. Thus the equation (11) represents the hypothesis that MPC members act forward looking.
Having re-specified the general form of the Council's reaction function in accordance with formula (11), we re-estimated the parameters of individual reaction functions for each Council member and the results indicate that in all seven individual reaction functions the variable which describes the growth rate of the exchange rate again proves statistically insignificant (at significance level of 10%) 9 . However, this time in most estimated equations the variable expressing the inflation rate was statistically significant. In addition, for all the analysed functions the value of McFadden's pseudo-R2 coefficient was significantly greater than in the previous case, which proves that the goodness of fit of model (11) for real data was better than that of model (3a). These results lead to the conclusion that MPC members act forward looking rather then backward looking. Detailed results of the estimations are presented in Table 2 .
The values presented in Table 2 indicate that for each of the seven individual reaction functions the value prod t-1 , which expresses the rate of industrial production growth, was statistically significant at the level of significance equal to 10%. In turn, with this level of significance, variable cpi t representing the current inflation rate was significant in 4 out of 7 equations, while in one (for JC) it was only slightly beyond the range of significance. Source: Own calculations. Column 7 (8) contains the marginal probability of increasing (decreasing) restrictiveness of the monetary policy, corresponding to a rise (fall) of current inflation by 0.1 percentage point from 2.5%, with the assumption that production growth dynamics was the mean sample value, that is, 8.8%. Similarly, column 9 (10) contains the marginal probability of increase (decrease) of restrictiveness of the monetary policy corresponding to a rise (fall) of industrial production growth dynamics lagged by one period by 1 percentage point from 8.8%, with inflation rate equal to 2.5%. For MP the marginal probabilities of increase in the restrictiveness of the monetary policy were not calculated, because this MPC member, in accordance with the definition adopted in the paper, never voted for tightening the monetary policy in the period covered by our study.
Analysis of marginal probabilities indicates that with inflation rising by 0.1 p. p. the increase of probability of tightening of monetary policy is the greatest for LB/MN/HWT (column 7); while with inflation dropping by 0.1 p. p. the greatest increase of probability of easing of monetary policy occurs for AS/AW (column 8). Also, the strongest reaction to growing industrial production can be seen in the decisions of LB/MN/HWT (column 9); while dropping production results in the highest growth of probability of easing of the monetary 10 In these two models the influence of inflation lagged by one period was also statistically insignificant.
policy in the case of MP and again AS/AW (column 10). Out of all the models that were taken into account, the reaction function constructed for MP proved to be the best fit for empirical data (the highest value of McFadden's pseudo-R2 coefficient).
As the next stage of this part of our study, we compared the forecasting performance of the models discussed above. Table 3 contains a comparison of the actual decisions of MPC members and the forecasts of these decisions determined using the rule of maximal probability (see subsection 3.4). Based on the results presented in Table 3 , one may assume that the model proposed for description of the reaction function of MP displays the best forecasting performance. In case of this model, all 18 decisions were forecast correctly (correct decisions), however, it is worthwhile to observe that, according to the classification adopted in this paper, MP never voted for tightening the monetary policy, which allowed us to reduce the number of analysed categories to two and undoubtedly contributed to obtaining such a high accuracy of forecasts.
this event, as many as six times the forecast determined using the rule maximal probability differed from the real decisions taken by this Council member.
In total, the mean forecast error for all the analysed models was approx. 19% (24 erroneous indications out of 126 possible ones).
For each of the analysed reaction functions, on the basis of formulas (11a)-(11c) also theoretical values of probability of increase no change or decrease of the restrictiveness of the monetary policy were determined on the assumption that inflation was below, in the middle and above the permitted fluctuation range for the inflation target set at 2.5+/-1%. Table 4 . Theoretical values of conditional probabilities for selected inflation levels CPI = 1.5% CPI = 2.5% CPI = 3.5% Council Member P(y t = -1) P(y t = 0) P(y t = 1) P(y t = -1) P(y t = 0) P(y t = 1) P(y t = -1) P(y t = 0) P(y t = 1) Source: Own calculations. For MP the values of probabilities of increased restrictiveness of the monetary policy are equal to zero, because this MPC member, according to the definition adopted in this paper, never voted for tightening the monetary policy in the period covered by the study. All conditional probabilities were determined for the same level of industrial production growth dynamics equal to the sample's mean, i.e. 8.8%.
LB/MN/HWT
The values put together in Table 4 show that if the inflation rate is equal to the lower limit of the inflation target 11 , then the highest probability of easing the monetary policy may be ascribed to Council members AS and AW (67.1%). For DF the probability of easing of monetary policy is in this situation the smallest and equals only 4.7%.
With inflation equal to the upper target limit, a decision to tighten the monetary policy is most likely for the Council members LB, MN and HWT. The one who would be the least willing to vote for tightening of monetary policy with this inflation level would be SN (save for MP, who, according to model, never took such decisions). Therefore it is clear that the behaviour of MPC members in situations when inflation is close to the lower and upper limit of the permissible range of fluctuations is somewhat asymmetrical.
Considerable asymmetry becomes apparent also when we consider the behaviour of the Council members, described on the basis of the model, when the inflation rate is equal to the inflation target, that is 2.5%. In as many as five cases the probability of easing of monetary policy is considerably higher than the probability of tightening it and only for one
Council member (DF) this probability is slightly lower. However, it is worth pointing out that all conditional probabilities in Table 4 were calculated with the assumption that at the given moment the annual dynamics of industrial production growth was equal to 8. 
Reaction function with inflation expectations -MPC acts forward looking (variant II)
In the second part of the study we analysed individual reaction functions of MPC members corresponding to equation (3b), where the only explanatory variable was the variable expressing market expectations as to the inflation level in 12 months' time. In accordance with the hypothesis formulated here, the Council, instead of reacting to determinants of future inflation, that is current inflation, the size of output gap and the pace of increase of the exchange rate, reacts only to changes of inflation forecast prepared for a period roughly corresponding to the period of influence of monetary policy (12 months). The results of estimations for this variant of the function are presented in Table 5 . Out of all the analysed functions, only in the model describing the way DF takes decisions did the variable expressing the level of future inflation prove statistically insignificant (at significance level equal to 10%). In five models this variable was significant at significance level of 5%, and in one at significance level of 10%. In all the models, the When evaluating the forecasting performance of the estimated models (see Table 6 ), one can say that the real decisions taken by a Council member match to the greatest extent the reaction functions construed for MP and SN, while the greatest number of "miss" decisions (failed forecasts) occurred in the case of models for LB/MN/HWT, JC, DF and SO. It is also worth pointing out that the mean forecast error for all models jointly is 25.4% and is greater than the mean forecast error for reaction functions in the form (3a) estimated in subsection 4.1, which error was 19%. r may be described using equation (3b) and that, consequently, decisions of Council members depend solely on the forecast of future inflation), one can state that in the analysed period DF put forward the tightest monetary policy, being followed by LB, MN and HWT, while the promoted of the least tightening policy was MP. It is also worthwhile to observe that 13 One should remember that in the general case forecasts of the dependent variable based on an analysis of boundary values and according to the rule of maximal probability may be different. 14 For MP the discussed range of variability for variable cpi and exchange rate differ from the previous expectations. In this case, estimations concern the parameters of equation (3c) and all explanatory variables except for exchange rate were lagged by one period (these were the data the Council had at the time of taking decisions).
However, the obtained results demonstrate that in each of the seven individual react ns that we considered both the variable expressing the deviation of industrial production growth dynamics forecast from the actual realisation of this variable and the variable which is the difference between the forecast and the real value of exchange rate were statistically insignificant (at significance level of 10%). For this reason, these variables were removed from equation (3c), and Only in 4 out of 7 individual reaction functions did the explanatory variable prove significant at significance level equal to 10%. In addition, the goodness of fit of models to the empirical data (pesudo-R2) was significantly lower than in both variants of the reaction function analysed in subsections 4.1 and 4.2.
Since the results did not confirm the hypothesis formulated in this subsection, the models presented in Table 7 were not analysed any further.
Summary
This 3) Decisions of most MPC members in the field of tightening or easing of the monetary policy are, to a considerable extent, asymmetrical. When inflation is equal to the inflation target and the annual rate of industrial production growth is equal to the sample's mean value (8.8%), in the case of Council members JC, SN, SO, MP, AS and AW the probability of easing of the monetary policy is much higher than the probability of tightening it.
These probabilities become equal only when the rate of industrial production growth reaches approx. 13.5%. For the remaining MPC members (LB, HWT, MN, DF), when production growth dynamics is 8.8%, the probabilities that they will take a decision to tighten or ease monetary policy are similar.
4) The results of estimations for variant II of the model indicate that in as many as six out of seven analysed individual reaction functions the variable expressing inflation forecast for the 12 months to come was statistically significant. This may be the evidence for the forward looking behaviour of the MPC members. However, both the goodness of fit for empirical data (pseudo-R2) and the forecasting performance of these models were worse than those for models analysed in modified variant I (with the future inflation instead of the lagged one). 6) There was no confirmation for the hypothesis that MPC considers, when taking decisions, the deviations of current values of inflation, industrial production growth and exchange rate from their earlier forecasts. In the models corresponding to the third analysed variant of reaction function (3c), all variables which expressed the deviation of forecast of industrial production growth from the actual realisation of this variable, all variables which were the difference between the forecast and actual exchange rate, as well as 3 out of 7 variables describing the difference between real and forecasted inflation were statistically insignificant. In addition, the goodness of fit of the models to real data was significantly lower than for the models in variants I and II of the reaction function.
In the summary we can say that MPC members act forward looking rather than However, when interpreting the obtained results, one should bear in mind that the study was based on a relatively short sample, with only 18 observations, while certain elements of statistical inference used in this paper (in particular the assessment of statistical significance of explanatory variables in the model -see footnote 9), have mainly asymptotical character in logit models.
Moreover, the forecasts of inflation, industrial production growth or exchange rate used here were the average expectations of economists and market analysts determined on the basis of Reuters questionnaire, while MPC in its decisions could take into account other available forecasts. Therefore the results should be approached with appropriate caution and it would be worthwhile to repeat the study for a longer sample and, maybe, also for a different set of explanatory variables.
